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chaos: the refugee crisis in
Albania
by Toby Porter
he three months from April to
June 1999 saw a massive emer-
gency aid programme, as large
and as high profile as any operation
with refugees since the Great Lakes cri-
sis of 1994. The stage may have been
different but most of the actors were the
same. UN agencies, NGOs, donors, for-
eign armies and the media all landed in
force in Albania in early April and began
to play their part in responding to the
needs of the refugees. The resources
available to aid agencies, via govern-
ments and through public appeals, were
higher than they had ever been. The
humanitarian programme was welcomed
and facilitated at every level, by the gov-
ernment and population of Albania.
There was an abundance of logistical
support provided by foreign armies,
principally from NATO countries. There
were no particular security concerns. All
the ingredients were apparently in place
for an efficient and well-run emergency
operation. 
And yet, for many of us working in
Tirana, the Albania emergency pro-
gramme raised as many questions as it
answered. Speculation and conjecture
about what might have been done better
will come to dominate the policy debates
in the months and years to come. 
Coordination of the aid effort
To discuss the coordination of humani-
tarian assistance in Albania, even at this
early stage, runs the risk of repetitive-
ness. Public statements by some donor
governments and NGOs about the quality
of coordination in Albania were well
publicized. UNHCR became more and
more irritated with what they perceived
as observations that were neither origi-
nal nor constructive. Proof of poor
coordination was not hard to come by.
There
were
instances
of several
NGOs
competing
to work in
the same
camps, duplication of essential services,
and, above all, a great variance in the
standards in different camps. People
looked to UNHCR to provide coordina-
tion and were quick to allocate blame
where it was lacking. In fairness to
UNHCR, there were aspects of the
refugee crisis in Albania that, from the
outset, made coordination extremely dif-
ficult, if not impossible. No analysis can
afford to overlook these constraints.
The dispersal of the refugee population
was a major factor. By its peak at the
end of the first week of June, the
refugee population in Albania was esti-
mated at 460,000 people. Of these, some
270,000 refugees were living with host
families.
1 The balance of refugees was
spread out in camps and collective cen-
tres. Some of the camps held several
thousand refugees, while some of the
smaller collective centres held no more
than a dozen. The number of these sites
was estimated at between 700 and 900.
However much one might be in favour
‘philosophically’ of refugees being so
spread out and avoiding the creation of
tented cities so vividly associated with
previous refugee crises, this has to be
balanced with an objective assessment
of our own capacities and systems as
relief agencies. 
Relief agencies are accustomed to
responding to certain scenarios and
were simply overwhelmed by having so
many sites to assess and to service.
NGOs were able to pick and choose
where to concentrate their resources
while the mandate of UNHCR compelled
them to be everywhere at the same time
as lack of resources exposed them to
criticism for not doing so. In simple
terms, they could not attain the coverage
that decent coordination requires.
There is a saying that ‘you cannot DO
coordination to people who do not want
to be coordinated’, and nowhere was this
saying more true than in Albania in the
first three months of the refugee crisis.
The simple truth was that, even if they
This article explores the coordination of the
aid effort, the role of NATO and, finally,
whether the response to the Kosovo crisis has
strengthened or undermined the principles of
universality that govern the global provision
of humanitarian assistance.
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almost certainly have been unable to
provide the coordination required due to
other characteristics of the situation. 
Albania saw arguably the highest ever
proliferation of NGOs in a refugee crisis.
At its peak, there were over 160 NGOs
registered with the NGO Centre in
Tirana. While many were motivated by
altruistic considerations, there was also
a high proportion of ‘briefcase NGOs’,
there because they could not afford not
to be there. As soon as they had found a
site to work, their publicity machines
back home would whirr into action and
fundraise off the incredible sympathy
that the plight of the Kosovans had
evoked. Many of these organizations
failed to attend general or sectoral coor-
dination activities, actively resisted
attempts at being coordinated and even
refused to register their activities with
the Government of Albania or UNHCR. 
One can also better understand the par-
ticularities of coordination in Albania by
comparison with past refugee crises. In
Tanzania in 1994, for example, a coura-
geous and visionary Field Coordinator
for UNHCR in Ngara allocated each of
the key sectors to a handful of respected
NGOs and politely told the rest to pack
their bags. The result was impressive.
She did this because she was empowered
to do so – the Government of Tanzania
only allowed NGOs to operate in
Tanzania if invited to do so by UNHCR.
UNHCR could thus ‘DO coordination’ its
way. 
In Goma, a few months later, the UNHCR
found itself with an even greater crisis
to coordinate. After the chaos of the
first few weeks, it was slowly able to
exert its coordination role - one notable
way in which it did this was through
funding implementing partners to work
in the three main camps. Many of the
major donors (notably ECHO) empow-
ered UNHCR to do this by channelling all
of their funding direct to the refugee
agency, rather than setting up a multi-
tude of individual partnership
agreements. It was then up to UNHCR to
use its own funding of NGOs as a way to
‘DO coordination’. To no-one’s surprise,
it worked.
To understand how much has changed,
picture the scene in Tirana in early May
1999. At a meeting with NGOs, a senior
UNHCR official referred to his organiza-
tion as ‘technically bankrupt’ having
received no cash pledges in the first
month of the refugee crisis. Senior politi-
cal and diplomatic policy makers in the
UK, USA and EU, disappointed at UNHCR
reactions to the first wave of the crisis,
were said to have placed a personal veto
on cash funding to UNHCR.  
While this cash crisis ravaged UNHCR,
the NGOs had never had it so good. The
smallest of agencies found themselves
awash with funds, whether from private
or government sources, at a time when
UNHCR was appealing for financial sup-
port live on CNN.
2 Meanwhile the
Albanian government was neither willing
nor able to use UNHCR as a ‘quality con-
trol’ tool to ensure that only the most
established agencies operated on the
ground. Agencies, therefore, had no
incentive to be coordinated, and
appeared unwilling or unable to coordi-
nate themselves. In Albania, the inability
to ‘DO coordination’ had never been
more apparent.
The role of NATO
Coordination is linked to the second key
issue, that of NATO’s role in the relief
effort. Military disaster relief operations,
and resultant intense debate, are not
new. Nowhere have such operations
been on the massive scale we have seen
in the Kosovo crisis. The ‘bilaterals’, as
the NATO armies came to be known,
were hugely important actors in the
relief effort, not only providing the logis-
tical support traditionally associated
with the role of the military but also set-
ting up and managing refugee camps on
behalf of the governments that they rep-
resented.
3
At the onset of the crisis, the role played
by the military was criticized by
observers who noted the rather blurred
line between NATO as warring party
inside Kosovo and NATO as humanitari-
an actor just outside its borders. This
defence of principle, important though it
is, has to be seen against the reality that
without such logistical and material
intervention, the aid agencies would
have found it hard or impossible to
cope. This was particularly the case at
the onset of the crisis. The middle
ground that most people were happy to
occupy was to recognize that NATO had
a unique and important role to play in
the provision of logistical and technical
support but that their support should be
placed at the disposal, and under the
coordination, of UNHCR. This, in theory,
was fine.
In practice, however, this was not always
the case. The bilaterals forged ahead
with camp development, often without
the input of experienced site planners.
Some of the sites the military chose had
earlier been rejected by aid agencies as
entirely unsuitable for refugee camps. In
the scramble to set up camps, NGO
advice was ignored or went unheeded.
Latrines were poorly sited and tents
placed too close together, mistakes
which could easily have been avoided
had aid agencies assisted the armies at
the planning stage. 
21 FORCED MIGRATION review August 1999,   5
Kukes, Albania
U
N
H
C
R
/
R
 
C
h
a
l
a
s
a
n
i
learning from Kosovo featureThe guiding principle for many donor
governments came to be to pour as
much money as possible into ‘their’
camp, and to try and attract the maxi-
mum number of refugees to live there.
In Kukes, pictures of the major camps
further south away from the Kosovan
border were displayed on public notice
boards, in order to attract refugees
towards a particular camp. People could
see the tents that waited for them, the
kitchens where they would be served
food, the spaces where their children
could play.
Competing camps
were displayed
next to each other
in this makeshift
estate agency for
refugee camps.
Many coordination
problems were exacerbated. There was
often little or no incentive or mechanism
for bilateral agencies to coordinate with
UNHCR. Camps were often identified
and prepared by armies, long before
UNHCR was even aware of their exis-
tence. Even more galling to UNHCR was
the fact that the same governments were
often the most voluble in their criticism
of UNHCR’s ‘lack’ of coordination. 
A consequence of bilateralism was that
NGOs were seemingly selected to work
on a site on the basis of shared national-
ity. Broadly speaking, Spanish NGOs
worked in camps prepared by the
Spanish military, British NGOs worked in
camps prepared by the British Army and
so on. These arrangements were usually
made via the aid department of the
country concerned, who picked up the
bills of both the army that had prepared
the site and the aid agencies that would
manage it. It goes without saying that it
is difficult to ‘do coordination’ when
agencies are selected and financed on
this basis (and in total contrast to the
positive examples from the Great Lakes
in 1994). In brief, the lesson to be learnt
from the Kosovo crisis is that ‘bilateral-
ism’, almost by definition, undermines
coordination.
Principles of universality
Another major concern has been the
uneven standards set by the bilateral
actors. In some camps, the standards
were so high that people, only half jok-
ingly, came to ask whether there should
be maximum standards as well as mini-
mum ones. In less fortunate adjacent
camps standards were so low that
refugee families preferred not to move
in at all. One of the most striking exam-
ples was to be been in Shkodra, on the
border with Montenegro. One camp had
imported street lighting, hot showers
and several television rooms while in
another camp, only a few kilometres
away, tents lay in a gravel pit without so
much as a single communal space for
the whole camp. Per capita expenditure
on the former probably exceeded the lat-
ter by a factor of fifteen or twenty.
To raise questions
about high stan-
dards in refugee
camps is to enter a
minefield. It is
important, however,
if one starts from
the premise that all
refugees, from Kosovo and wherever
else in the world, have certain universal
rights to assistance. One distinct charac-
teristic about the aid effort in Albania
over the first three months was the
apparent absence of any sense of
‘absolute’ value of money, or any aware-
ness that resources were finite. There
was money to do almost anything and to
do it almost anywhere. There was, on
the face of it, no reason to hold back
from installing electric showers and
street lighting in a refugee camp if a
donor was prepared to offer funds. At
the same time, however, over half the
refugee population was receiving no
help whatsoever.
People living in host families or in pri-
vate accommodation did not receive
even a fraction of the attention or the
assistance given to people in camps. For
the first two months not a single food
distribution reached the 270,000
refugees in private accommodation. By
the end of June, financial assistance
promised by UNHCR ($10 per person
/month) had not reached host families.
This failure to reach refugees living with
host families will be looked upon (along-
side the failure to complete the
registration of refugees while they were
in Albania) as among the gravest short-
comings of the aid effort in Albania. 
Throughout this period some 190,000
refugees in camps and collective centres
were tended to by over a dozen foreign
armies, all the major UN agencies, and
some 160 NGOs. Total expenditure will
probably never be fully known. There
are staggering comparisons to be made.
The development costs alone of the US
Army/OFDA site known as Camp Hope,
near the town of Fier in the south of the
country, have been estimated at some
$50 million.
4 A maximum of 3,500
refugees lived in the camp at any one
time. If the same sum had been allocat-
ed to UNHCR to enable it to give $10 per
person per day to hosting families, all of
the 270,000 refugees living in private
accommodation would have been sus-
tained for between four to five months.
(More soberingly, expenditure on this
one relatively small camp would almost
fully fund this year’s UN consolidated
appeal for Angola.) 
Such comparisons may provoke unease
among agencies. However, those who are
familiar with the international assistance
system know full well that there are only
finite resources available for overseas
aid budgets. Comparative judgements
are more than merely useful – they are
essential. 
From the onset of the Kosovo refugee
crisis, aid agencies working in other
parts of the world noticed a drop in the
resources available for their ongoing
programmes. Initial commitments to
rebuild Honduran and Nicaraguan liveli-
hoods shattered by Hurricane Mitch
were not acted upon. Proposals for
emergency work in Sierra Leone and
Angola lay on the desks of donors,
unanswered and ultimately unfunded.
NGOs, for their part, pulled many senior
staff from programmes elsewhere in the
world to staff their programmes in
Albania and Macedonia. The internation-
al assistance system again showed itself
to be like a searchlight, flitting from one
corner of the world to the next. This
lack of consistency is fundamentally at
odds with the real needs of refugees and
disaster victims and the prospects of achiev-
ing a global or universalist perspective. 
People are already starting to ask to
what extent the response to the Kosovo
crisis creates precedents. Moral interven-
tionism is again on the agenda and
being discussed as a future foundation
of Western foreign policy. Some urge
caution and argue that NATO, for
example, has a specific political and
geographical sphere of operation, and
that intervention to end a conflict in
Europe fell directly within it. It would
therefore be mistaken to assume or to
advocate that the alliance will intervene
in similar instances in Africa or Asia. This
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‘bilateralism’, almost
by definition, under-
mines coordination
learning from Kosovo featureis a persuasive argument, however much
one might wish that it were otherwise.
On the humanitarian level, however, no
such argument exists. Our humanitarian
charters are instead explicitly founded
on global principles of universality – ‘the
right to receive assistance, and to offer
it, is a fundamental humanitarian princi-
ple which should be enjoyed by all
citizens of all countries. As members of
the international community, we recog-
nize our obligation to provide
humanitarian assistance wherever it is
needed.’
5
In recent times, these principles have
been most commonly associated with
initiatives (such as the Ground Rules in
south Sudan or The Principles of
Engagement in eastern Democratic
Republic of Congo) that involve repre-
sentatives of the international
community trying to gain acceptance of
these values by warring parties. How
often, though, do we apply these princi-
ples to ourselves? Within this framework
of universal rights, the quality and quan-
tity of humanitarian assistance should
be applied evenly to needs as they arise,
wherever and however that may be.
When the Kosovo refugee crisis is com-
pared to other contemporary disaster
zones such as Angola, the DRC or south
Sudan, some of the costs of the refugee
operation become impossible to justify.
Aid personnel accustomed to the diffi-
culties of securing donor funding for
even the most life-threatening emer-
gency in some of these forgotten areas
found it hard to come to terms with the
sheer quantity of resources available to
refugees in the Balkans. The response to
humanitarian need in Kosovo was, quite
literally, beyond compare. 
Why does it matter that so many
resources were poured into this one
refugee crisis? On what moral basis can
one criticize this sum, or indeed any
sum spent on a refugee population? 
The answers lie in the reality that aid
budgets are finite. Money spent on
streetlighting in Albania could have been
spent on vaccines in Cuito. If we fail to
attach a similar value to the preservation
or amelioration of a human life in
Angola as we do in Albania, then we
have, in the most basic way, failed the
very humanitarian principles that we are
so keen for others to adopt. The figures
of this crisis speak for themselves – the
international community currently
spends on an African refugee less than a
tenth of the amount spent to assist a
refugee in Europe. This gap has to be
significantly and quickly narrowed, if
our principles are not to appear hollow.
Toby Porter worked as Emergency
Programme Coordinator with Oxfam
GB in Albania. He wrote this in a
personal capacity. 
Email: tobyporter@hotmail.com. 
He is joining the RSP in October to
do the Master of Studies in Forced
Migration.
1  In June, the term was changed to refugees living in
‘private accommodation’, in order to reflect the com-
mercial nature of the arrangement in the majority of
cases.
2  This seismic shift in the relative positions of the
UNHCR and the NGOs in the five years since Goma
cannot be overstated – nor should it be welcomed.
Only the most shortsighted NGOs would welcome a
weakened UNHCR and the coordination vacuum that
would ensue. 
3 Even the names of the refugee camps reflected this.
A visitor to Kukes would arrive at ‘Italian 1’, and then
proceed to ‘Greek Camp’ and ‘Italian 2’. These named
after the armies that set up and managed the camp.
4  Figure given by OFDA official during informal con-
versation
5 Code of Conduct for the International Red Cross and
Red Crescent Movement and Non-Governmental
Organisations in Disaster Relief.
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